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ICLRStrongName::StrongNameSignatureVerificationFromImage Method

  • Článek

Updated: July 2010

Verifies that an assembly that has already been mapped to memory is valid for the associated public key.

BOOLEAN StrongNameSignatureVerificationFromImage (
    [in]  BYTE    *pbBase,
    [in]  DWORD   dwLength,
    [in]  DWORD   dwInFlags,
    [out] DWORD   *pdwOutFlags
);

Parameters

  • pbBase
    [in] The relative virtual address of the mapped assembly manifest.

  • dwLength
    [in] The size, in bytes, of the mapped image.

  • dwInFlags
    [in] Flags that influence verification behavior. The following values are supported:

    • SN_INFLAG_FORCE_VER (0x00000001) - Forces verification even if it is necessary to override registry settings.

    • SN_INFLAG_INSTALL (0x00000002) - Specifies that this is the first verification performed on this image.

    • SN_INFLAG_ADMIN_ACCESS (0x00000004) - Specifies that the cache will allow access only to users who have administrative privileges.

    • SN_INFLAG_USER_ACCESS (0x00000008) - Specifies that the assembly will be accessible only to the current user.

    • SN_INFLAG_ALL_ACCESS (0x00000010) - Specifies that the cache will provide no guarantees of access restriction.

    • SN_INFLAG_RUNTIME (0x80000000) - Reserved for internal debugging.

  • pdwOutFlags
    [out] A flag for additional output information. The following value is supported:

    • SN_OUTFLAG_WAS_VERIFIED (0x00000001) - This value is set to false to specify that the verification succeeded due to registry settings.

Return Value

true if the method completed successfully; otherwise, false.

Requirements

Platforms: See .NET Framework System Requirements.

Header: MetaHost.h

Library: Included as a resource in MSCorEE.dll

.NET Framework Versions: 4

See Also

Reference

ICLRStrongName Interface

Change History

Date

History

Reason

July 2010

Added topic.

Information enhancement.